SECTION 117 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT: CHARTER OF THE SOFTWARE USERS\u27 RIGHTS OR AN ILLUSORY PROMISE? by Stern, Richard H.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 7 7 (1984-1985)
Issue 3 Article 3
1-1-1985
SECTION 117 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT:
CHARTER OF THE SOFTWARE USERS'
RIGHTS OR AN ILLUSORY PROMISE?
Richard H. Stern
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard H. Stern, SECTION 117 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT: CHARTER OF THE SOFTWARE USERS' RIGHTS OR AN
ILLUSORY PROMISE?, 7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 459 (1985), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol7/iss3/3
SECTION 117 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT: 

CHARTER OF THE SOFTWARE USERS' 

RIGHTS OR AN ILLUSORY PROMISE?t 

RICHARD H. STERN· 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION. • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . 459 

II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 117 ........... 460 

A. Why Did CONTU Recommend Section 117?....... 461 

B. What Congress Did .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 

III. SECTION 117 IN THE COURTS . . . . . . . . • • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . • . 467 

A. "Essential Step" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 

B. Who May Adapt? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 
C. The Hubco Case .................................. 468 

D. 	 The Strohon Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 

E. The Micro-Spare Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475 

F. The Formula Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476 

IV. 	 THE IMPLICATION OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 

SECTION 117........................................... 478 

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSALS...... .•.. ..•......••• 483 

I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has had a great deal of difficulty deciding what, if any­
thing, to do about computer software. l After years of inconclusive 
discussion preceding the 1976 revision of the copyright laws,2 Congress 
decided to punt. It passed a law creating a National Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).3 CONTU 
t © 	1985 Richard H. Stem. 
• A.B., Columbia University (1953); B.S.E.E., Columbia University (1954); LL.B., 
Yale Law School (1959). Member Washington, D.C. Bar and United States Supreme 
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Formerly Chief, Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice. 
1. The terms "computer software" and "computer program" are hereinafter used 
synonymously. 
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976). 
3. NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF CoPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974)(hereinafter CONTU). 
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members were to be appointed by the President, and were to include 
authors, users of copyrighted works, and the public. Congress created 
CONTU to advise Congress with respect to the existing copyright law 
and the proposal of amendments to that law.4 The commissioners 
studied the matter for several years and drafted a final report to Con­
gress.5 CONTU recommended adding to the existing copyright law a 
definition of computer programs, which had the effect of manifesting 
the Congressional intent to protect computer programs. Furthermore, 
CONTU recommended the enactment of section 117 of the Copyright 
Act,6 which is the focus of this article. 7 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 117 
When Congress eventually enacted section 117 in late 1980, it did 
so essentially in the form that CONTU recommended.s Unfortunately, 
however, it acted in haste at the very end of the second session of the 
95th Congress. Congress attached the copyright measure to a very 
substantial modification of the patent laws which occupied the atten­
tion of Congress far more than did section 117. In its haste, Congress 
failed to provide any legislative history for section 117.9 
As enacted, section 117 provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106 [dealing with the ex­
clusive rights of a copyright owner], it is not an infringement for the 
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the 
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program 
provided: 
4. Id. Although CONTU's membership was distinguished, not one of the commis­
sioners was an electrical engineer, a computer scientist, or an official of a computer manu­
facturing company. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, 107-09 (1978)(hereinafter CONTU RE­
PORT). Many of the witnesses who appeared before the commission, however, did have 
such credentials.Id. at 113-16. For a general critique of the work ofCONTU, see Samuel­
son, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in 
Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663. 
5. CONTU REPORT, supra note 4. 
6. Id. at 38. 
7. CONTU also recommended the repeal of former § 117 which had preserved the 
status of computer programs as it was prior to enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act. 
CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 38. All subsequent references to § 117 are to the 1980 
enactment. 
8. The only significant change was to restrict the benefits of § 117 to "owners" of 
copies of computer programs, rather than "rightful possessors" of such copies. See 
CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 12-13. 
9. This is unfortunate because the absence of an official legislative history has caused 
litigants and the courts much difficulty in interpreting the ambiguous language in § 117. 
See infra notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text. 
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(1) that such new a [sic] copy or adaptation is created as an essential 
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with 
a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or 
(2) that such a new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only 
Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authori­
zation of the copyright owner.10 
The language of section 117 is ambiguous. It uses terms that the 
act does not define and that are not explained in a legislative history. 
It is little wonder that the judicial opinions interpreting section 117 
tend only to obscure it further. 11 Scarcely four years after its enact­
ment, section 117 has been interpreted so maladroitly that legislative 
oversight hearings are already necessary. Congress should determine 
whether it wishes to have the law interpreted as the courts have inter­
preted it to date and whether the law needs clarification or complete 
rewriting. Some kind of amendment is probably necessary because, as 
section 117 now stands, it is practically useless. 
A. Why Did CONTU Recommend Section 117? 
Section 117 was part of a compromise within CONTU .. On one 
hand, there was considerable pressure to bring computer programs 
within the scope of the copyright law. Computer programs had re­
ceived only inhospitable treatment under existing patent laws,12 were 
probably preempted from state law protection,13 and, unless protected 
under the copyright laws, would probably remain vulnerable to piracy. 
The prospect of persuading Congress to enact a special law for com­
puter programs seemed unlikely to CONTU, despite the Supreme 
Court's repeated urging that Congress consider legislation specifically 
directed to computer programs. 14 CONTU believed that fairness and 
10. 17 U.S.c. § 117 (1980). 
11. See, e.g., Micro-Spare, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984); 
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); and Hubco Data Prod. 
Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983). 
12. See, e.g.. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 
(1976); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
13. See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univer­
sity Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). 
But see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1974). 
14. See. e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 & n.19 (1978); Gottschalk v. Ben­
son, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972). The majority of the CONTU commissioners decided against 
recommending enactment of a special law. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
CONTU supported the enactment of an amendment to the existing copyright law to in­
clude protection of computer programs. Id. at 12-13. Commissioner Hersey dissented 
462 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459 
the importance of encouraging investment in program development re­
quired some form of protection for the creators of computer programs. 
On the other hand, CONTU believed that extending the copy­
right law in full to proprietors of computer programs might unduly 
hamper competition and user-exploitation of computer technology for 
the public good. Furthermore, CONTU feared that such an extension 
might deprive computer program users of their ability to get the bene­
fit of the bargain struck when they purchased programs. CONTU, 
therefore, recommended a compromise. It gave something to each 
group: IS Computer programs were to be explicitly brought within the 
Copyright Act but section 117 would protect the legitimate interests of 
. the users. 
The CONTU report explained section 117 and the rationale for 
the compromise by positing that "the placement of a work into a com­
puter is the preparation of a [potentially infringing] copy."16 Unfortu­
nately, CONTU began its analysis with a defective (or at least 
questionable) initial premise. Placement of a work such as a computer 
program into a computerl7 is an act of copyright infringementl8 only 
when the work is placed into the computer in a "fixed" form. That is 
to say that the embodiment of the computer program in the computer 
"is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro­
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transi­
tory duration."19 Yet a computer program or other work may be 
placed into a computer system in a variety of ways. It may be copied 
onto a tape or diskette or photochemically imprinted onto a silicon 
chip. When either process has been completed, the work is "fixed," 
and there is a potentially infringing "copy. "20 But the computer pro­
gram may simply be placed into the temporary read/write memory 
from the majority's report, and in a preliminary version of the report he proposed a sepa­
rate computer program law. He omitted that proposal, however, from his dissent to the 
CONTU REPORT. In retrospect, CONTU's timidity was a serious mistake. 
15. CONTU asserted that it had considered the interests of the producers and manu­
facturers of computer software, as well as the interests of the software users. CONTU 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-18. 
16. Id. at 13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) and 501(a) (1982) make it a copyright infringe­
ment to reproduce a work in copies. It is not an act of copyright infringement to use a copy 
of a computer program without reproducing it in a new copy. See. e.g., Foreign & Domes­
tic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627 (2nd. Cir. 1952). 
17. "Inputting" the computer program. 
18. "Reproduction" in a copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982). 
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). 
20. Usually, the software proprietor makes the software available to customers in the 
form of machine-usable tapes, diskettes, or chips, so that the customers do not need to 
make additional fixed copies merely to input the software into the machine. 
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(RAM) of the computer, in which the computer program is "read" 
from a fixed copy or is entered by key strokes. In that case, the com­
puter program in RAM will not be fixed; it will simply be a transitory 
. and ephemeral writing, like a message written in sand. When the eleC­
trical power for the computer is turned off, the work will vanish from 
the RAM of the computer. That is not a potentially infringing copy. 
Computer programs are most frequently placed into computers in 
RAM, only transitorily and ephemerally, rather than "fixed" into per­
manent memory.21 Therefore, most of the time, the act of inputting a 
computer program does not involve an act of copyright 
infringement.22 
In any event, the CONTU rationale for enacting section 117 be­
gan with the following premise: A need exists for permitting owners of 
copies of programs to place them into computers and yet avoid the 
risk of copyright infringement liability when doing SO.23 Regardless of 
whether the premise was sound, CONTU concluded that this was one 
reason why section 117 was needed: "One who rightfully possesses a 
copy of a program, therefore, should be provided with a legal right to 
copy it to that extent which will permit its use by that possessor. "24 
But making copies by loading or inputting the program is not a 
computer program owner's only problem. CONTU articulated a sec­
ond need for section 117: 
Because of a lack of complete standardization among program­
ming languages and hardware in the computer industry, one who 
rightfully acquires a copy of a [computer] program frequently can­
not use it without adapting it to that limited extent which will allow 
its use in the possessor's computer. The copyright law, which 
grants to copyright proprietors the exclusive right to prepare trans­
lations, transformations, and adaptations of their work, should no 
21. A familiar example of this occurs every morning in offices, when users of word 
processing equipment turn microcomputers on, insert diskskettes containing a word 
processing program, and "boot up" the programs. 
22. It is unclear why CONTU created the "straw man" problem of risk of copyright 
infringement liability for inputting computer programs into computers. Perhaps, CONTU 
sought to influence courts to find copyright infringement liability for unauthorized acts of 
inputting computer programs into the RAMs of computers, despite the difficulty under the 
present copyright statute of doing so. Unauthorized inputting of a computer program into 
RAM should be an act of infringement of the computer program owner's rights, but it is 
not under present law. 
23. CONTU did not consider whether the customer of the owner of the copyright in 
a computer program has a license implied by law to use the computer program in the 
manner that the copyright owner and the customer contemplated when they entered into 
the initial transaction. 
24. CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
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more prevent such use than it should prevent rightful possessors 
from loading programs into their computers. Thus a right to make 
those changes necessary to enable the use for which it was both sold 
and purchased should be provided.25 
CONTU gave two examples of the need for an adaptation right. 
First, it said that "[t]he conversion of a program from one higher-level 
language to another to facilitate use would fall within this right 
...."26 By this, CONTU meant rewriting a computer program that 
has been written in one computer language, such as BASIC,27 Pas­
cal,28 COBOL,29 FORTRAN,30 APL,31 PL/l,32 C,33 or Forth,34 into 
another such language to facilitate the program's ability to run in an­
. other computer. This is not a major practical problem, but it deserves 
consideration. 35 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. See SIPPL & SIPPL, COMPUTER DICfIONARY AND HANDBOOK (1980). The au­
thors describe BASIC (acronym for Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code) as 
"one of the easiest computer programming languages to learn and master." Id. at 35. 
28. Id. at 379. Pascal is a language "designed to enable teaching of programming as 
a systematic discipline and to do systems programming." Id. Nonetheless, Pascal is widely 
used in writing applications programs. 
29. Id. at 82. COBOL (acronym for COmmon Business Oriented Language). "This 
is a common procedural language designed for commercial data processing as developed 
and defined by a national committee of computer manufacturers and users." Id. 
30. Id. at 213-14. Fortran (acronym for FORmula TRANslation) is "[a] compiler 
language developed by the IBM Corporation, originally conceived for use on scientific 
problems but now widely adapted for most commercial problems as well." Id. 
31. Id. at 20. APL (acronym for A Programming Language) was developed by Iver­
son. "An unusually extensive set of operators and data structures are used to implement 
what is considered by many to be the most flexible, powerful, and concise algorithmic/ 
procedural language in existence." Id. 
32. Id. at 387. "This language has some features that are characteristic of FOR­
TRAN and incorporates some of the best features of other languages, such as string manip­
ulation, data structures, and extensive editing capabilities." Id. 
33. Id. at 55. C has been defined as "[a] somewhat structured high-level program­
ming language designed to optimize run time, size, and efficiency. It was developed as the 
systems programming language of the UNIX operating system on the PDP 11/70 min­
icomputer from Digital Equipment Corp." /d. 
34. Id. at 213. "Forth is a programming language system which can be implemented 
readily on microcomputers, and which offers high-level means of expressing solutions to a 
wide range of problems." Id. 
35. The rewriting with which CONTU concerned itself has not yet created any liti­
gation or threats of litigation of which the author is aware. Usually, if there is a problem, it 
is in the translation of a computer program into a different machine language (object code) 
to permit the program to run on a second machine; or to rewrite the program to run under 
a different operating system that is used in the second machine. This can be quite burden­
some in the case of computer programs that were written in assembly language to enable 
faster execution, rather than in high-level language as CONTU contemplated. For a dis­
cussion of the latter problem, see generally Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 
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Second, according to CONTU, the adaptation right is necessary 
to give software users "the right to add features to the program that 
were not present at the time of rightful acquisition. "36 This has be­
come a vital issue; much of the litigation arising under section 117 has 
concerned the user's right to alter the computer program. For exam­
ple, a word processing program may not contain a dictionary when it 
is acquired, so that the human operator must provide the hyphenation 
and make spelling checks. A billing program may lack the necessary 
means for charging different clients different hourly rates, or for pre­
paring summaries. The user may very much want to enhance the 
function of the computer program by adding features that adapt the 
program to carry out these additional tasks. The enhancement aspect 
of the adaptation right is the major value of section 117 to users.37 
Curiously, CONTU considered these rights of adaptation of a 
computer program to be "necessarily more private in nature than the 
right to load a program by copying it."38 Therefore, they should be 
exercised only by the original customer and the programs should not 
be resold with the adaptations unless the copyright proprietor has con­
sented. 39 The CONTU report does not explain why a computer pro­
gram is more "private in nature" than the hardware used to run it. 
Nor does it explain why a computer program is more private in nature 
than the pens, paper, typewriters, and calculators it replaces.40 In any 
event, the rights articulated in section 117 do not extend to the user's 
resale of a modified computer program. Moreover, CONTU said, 
"[s]hould [copyright] proprietors feel strongly that they do not want 
rightful possessors of their programs to prepare such adaptations, they 
could, of course, make such desires a contractual matter."41 Like the 
privacy in the nature of computer programs, the significance of the 
desires of sellers as to what their customers may do (and why these 
desires deserve deference in the face of an apparently contrary statu­
tory policy) is unexplained. 
Most curiously, CONTU failed to consider specifically "debug­
1336 (9th Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1984) (No. 84­
761). 
36. CONTU REpORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
37. This article is only peripherally concerned with the right under § 117(2) to make 
archival copies. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
38. CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
39. Id. 
40. The resale, in modified form, of pens, paper, typewriters, and calculators is not 
restricted by law. 
41. CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
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ging,"42 a truly essential adaptation of computer programs. The lit­
erallanguage of the adaptation rights provision of section 117 appears 
to extend as much to debugging, however, as to other adaptations. 
Finally, CONTU said that users need to make "backup" or "ar­
chival" copies of computer programs "to guard against destruction or 
damage."43 Having another copy available when the regular working 
copy is damaged permits the computer program owner to continue to 
use the computer in the owner's business, despite the damage. The 
owner might otherwise suffer serious disruption to its regular business. 
Making archival copies would probably be held an act of copyright 
infringement, because it involves making a "fixed" reproduction of the 
work. But the argument might prevail that in such circumstances 
backup copying is a "fair use" of the copyrighted work, or that the 
customer has an implied license to make backup copies. Still, it is 
obviously better to avoid uncertainty on this point.44 
The above is a complete summary of the very limited pre-Con­
gressional legislative history of section 117.45 CONTU desired to 
compromise its proposed grant of copyright protection to proprietors 
of computer programs with some sort of guarantee to users that their 
rights would also be safeguarded. To balance the grant to proprietors, 
CONTU sought to deal with two largely nonexistent problems of users 
(inputting computer programs into computers and making high-level 
language translations) and with a third problem that is of considerable 
importance to users (enhancements). It failed to consider debugging, 
an equally serious problem, but by fortunate accident covered it any­
way. Finally, it dealt with the potentially serious issue of backup cop­
ies. The question remains, however, whether the users of programs 
received meaningful benefits from this compromise. 
42. "Bugs" are mistakes made by computer programmers. Bugs must be removed or 
corrected to prevent such disasters as occasionally writing paychecks for one hundred times 
their proper amount. "Debugging" is the removal of the computer programmer's errors. 
See Bender, Software Protection: The 1985 Perspective, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405, 409 
(1985). 
43. CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
44. Case law arising under § 117 illustrates the danger of uncertainty. See, e.g., 
Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Corp., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. 
Idaho 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Micro-Sparc, 
Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984). These decisions illustrate how 
§ 117 has fueled litigation and has been the subject of perplexing judicial interpretation. 
45. The legislative hisotry of § 117 exists only in the recommendations made by 
CONTU. Congress passed § 117 based on the CONTU recommendations with only one 
change. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. See also infra note 46 and accompanying 
text. 
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B. What Congress Did 
Congress passed section 117 with one change from the version 
recommended by CONTU. Without explanation why, the rights of 
"rightful possessors" of computer programs became the rights of 
"owners."46 This modification left the door open to extensive sleight 
of hand in the name of bailments, leases, licenses, and other putatively 
nonsale transactions. Whether the courts will interpret section 117 to 
permit marketers of software to withdraw the benefits of the section 
from customers when the marketers denominate the transaction as 
something other than a sale and when the customer becomes, at least 
in name, something less than an owner,47 remains to be seen.48 
Aside from this modification there is no formal legislative history 
for section 117. Congress simply followed CONTU's recommenda­
tions without further explanation.49 As several courts have noted, 
there is no legislative history in the ordinary sense, and aside from the 
"plain" meaning of the statute, the CONTU report is all the guidance 
to which the courts can look. sO To be sure, there is always the possible 
"common sense" approach to statutory interpretation; however, such 
considerations have not been paramount in the judicial interpretation 
of section 117. 
III. SECTION 117 IN THE COURTS 
A. "Essential Step" 
A major problem left unresolved by section 117 is what it means 
for an adaptation of a computer program to be "created as an essential 
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a 
machine."si It may mean, as at least one court has concluded, that 
the adaptation is "indispensable" to the use of the computer pro­
gramS2 and, therefore, that the adaptation may not be a mere "conven­
46. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). See supra text accompanying note 10. 
47. For instance, the customer becomes less than an owner in bailment, license, and 
lease arrangements. 
48. See generally United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942)(patent license 
case); Stern, Shrink- Wrap Licenses of Mass-Marketed Software in the United States, I 
AsIAN PAC. REV. OF COMPUTERS, TECHNOLOGY, & LAW 13 (1984) (discussing copyright 
considerations and § 117). 
49. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
50. See. e.g., Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) 11 
25,613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6,1983); Midway Mfg Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D. 
Ill. 1983). 
51. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
52. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'), Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617,622 (C.D. Cal. 
1984). 
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ience" to the use of the program. 53 Another court has perhaps so held 
by implication. 54 
Yet this interpretation of "essential" undermines the principal 
benefit (or privilege) that the user was supposed to receive under sec­
tion 117-the right to enhance computer programs. CONTU said 
that section 117 was necessary to permit users to add to programs the 
enhancements that were lacking when the user originally acquired the 
program. 55 Enhancements, however, are not indispensable. If they 
were, the user would not have bought the unenhanced program in the 
first place. 
B. Who May Adapt? 
Another difficulty that remains unresolved by section 117 is in 
determining who may adapt a computer program to add enhance­
ments. Section 117 permits the owner of a computer program to "au­
thorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer 
program."56 A large number of computer program owners, perhaps 
the overwhelming majority, are not capable of making their own adap­
tations to their computer programs. Typically, such users are not 
computer programmers, and they lack the skills and equipment neces­
sary to make adaptations to existing computer programs. In the few 
cases involving vicarious activity that have been decided under section 
117 to date, the courts have held that it is copyright infringement for a 
third party to adapt or copy a computer program for the owner of a 
computer program. 57 The effect is to make the adaptation right under 
section 117 an illusory promise. The following cases illustrate the 
trend in judicial interpretation of section 117. 
C. The Hubco Case 
The first case in which the section 117 adaptation right was urged 
as a defense to a claim of infringement of a copyrighted computer pro­
gram illustrated several of the difficulties faced by those who seek to 
invoke section 117. In Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management 
53. Id. 
54. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
55. CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
56. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
57. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Fonnula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 
1983). 
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Assistance, Inc.,58 the alleged infringer (Hubco) sought to circumvent 

a marketing strategy that a copyright owner (MAl) had devised for 

charging its customers what the traffic would bear. 59 MAl marketed 

the same operating system60 software to computer owners whose com­

puter systems varied widely in cost and capability.61 Perhaps one hy­

pothetical customer's computer system would have one megabyte of 

memory and cost $100,000.62 A second customer's system might have 

. ten megabytes of memory and cost $300,000. A third customer's sys­

tem might have 100 megabytes of memory and cost $1,000,000. 
Clearly, the third customer can and will pay much more for the 
operating system than the first, barring unrestricted competition or ar­
bitrage, because the value of the benefit conferred on the third cus­
tomer is much greater. MAl, therefore, would configure its operating 
system software for the first of these hypothetical customers to support 
only one megabyte of memory. MAl would charge its customer (let 
us say) $10,000 for that operating system. For the second customer, 
MAl would have configured the operating system software to support 
only ten megabytes and charged $50,000; and for the third, a 100­
megabyte memory limit and a $100,000 charge. By employing such a 
marketing strategy, MAl was able to exact prices in accordance with 
value rather than setting a uniform price for the product. Under a 
uniform price, MAl would probably charge some customers too little 
(i.e., less than they might be induced to pay), while perhaps deterring 
other customers from buying the product because the uniform price 
was excessive compared to the value that the customer received. 
MAl, therefore, configured the operating systems differently for 
each customer to support use of only the specified (and paid-for) 
amount of memory. It did· so by inserting "governors" into the 
software.63 MAl delivered the operating system to the customer as a 
disk or tape in which the software was stored in machine-readable 
machine language.64 The governors were portions of that machine 
58. 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983). No appeal was prosecuted in the 
Hubco case. 
59. [d. at 452. 
60. An operating system is a set of computer programs that govern the internal oper­
ation of a computer system. For example, the operating system allocates access to the 
central processing unit of the computer among various tasks, in accordance with a prede­
termined task priority ranking. 
61. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 452. 
62. Hypothetical customers and figures in connection with the Hubco case are pro­
vided in this article to illustrate the author's point more conveniently. 
63. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 452. 
64. Machine-readable machine language (object code) is a sequence of magnetized 
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language encoded in the disk or tape, and forming part of the com­
puter program. They limited the memory access and other capabilities 
of the system.65 
A customer wishing to upgrade its computer system to contain 
more memory than the computer could originally access would have 
to allow MAl to perform a reconfiguration. If the customer wanted to 
upgrade from one megabyte to ten megabytes of memory for example, 
MAl might charge the hypothesized $40,000 differential between the 
prices of a one and ten megabyte operating system. Upon being paid, 
MAl would modify the governor to permit access to the upgraded 
memory limit. 
Hubco decided to circumvent this marketing strategy by decod­
ing and "reverse engineering"66 MAl's governor system. Hubco be­
came a competitor with MAl in the upgrade business.67 Clearly, 
Hubco could undersell MAl for upgrade services.68 Not having had 
to make the initial investment in developing the operating system, 
Hubco was a lower-cost operation; at least it was willing to charge less 
for the same service. Of course, MAl, the copyright owner, consid­
ered Hubco's form of business competition "piracy," and it sought 
legal redress against the wretched "free rider." 
One way to analyze the problem that the Hubco case presented 
would have been to ask whether the copyright owner's marketing pro­
gram was objectionable. It had a product that was valued differently 
by different customers, because each customer used that product dif­
ferently - as one customer might use gasoline to operate a Rolls 
Royce while another uses the same grade gasoline to operate a Volk­
swagen. Apparently, it was impractical for MAl to install a meter on 
each customer's computer and to charge the customer a monthly rate 
in accordance with the number of bits of information processed that 
month. Instead, MAl used the governors and upgrade fees to accom­
and unmagnetized domains on the disk or tape, corresponding to the Os and Is of the 
symbolic machine language or object code version of the computer program. 
65. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 542. In effect, the governors were lines of computer 
code inserted into the operating system computer program at an appropriate point, that 
directed the computer not to attempt to access more than x megabytes of memory. In the 
course of "obeying" the other operational commands of the operating system, 'the cus­
tomer's computer system would also obey this command. 
66. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 452. The term "reverse engineering" refers to the 
technique of ascertaining how a product is made, by studying the product. See Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (reverse engineering is accomplished by , 
"starting with the known product and working backward to divine the process which aided 
in its development or manufacture"). 
67. Hubco, 219 U:.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 452. 
68. Id. at 452, 457. 
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plish the same purpose - to fine tune the price to the value of the 
product to each customer, which is to say the price which that cus­
tomer was willing to pay. Although in principle this practice is proba­
bly not objectionable, the means selected for executing the practice 
may be questionable. 
The argument might be advanced that it is objectionable to sell a 
product to a customer while keeping that product on a string - to 
exercise remote control over the customer's use of its property once it 
has purchased that property.69 Furthermore, one might argue that the 
customer has an adaptation right under section 117, and that unless 
the customer has explicitly contracted that right away the seller has no 
business limiting the customer's adaptation of the property. Even if 
the contract70 expressly forbids the customer from modifying the com­
puter program, one might even argue that the contract should not be 
enforced, because it derrogates from section 117.71 
If the customer has circumvented the governors to do a "self­
help" upgrade of the operating system software, it would seem prefera­
ble to remit the matter to contract law rather than to regard it as 
copyright infringement. While there is no objection in principle to let­
ting the copyright owner charge its customers what the traffic will 
bear, there is no reason for the government to enforce the marketing 
program by making it an act of copyright infringement to circumvent 
the program. Accordingly, if the customers have made their own ad­
aptations to the software (without breaching a contractual provision 
not to do so) they should be left alone. That appears to be one of the 
primary purposes of section 117. 
Of course, that is not what happened in Rubeo. The customers 
were not going to reverse engineer and decode the computer programs 
in order to modify the governors, any more than they were going to 
build their own computers. The only way MAl customers could get a 
cheap upgrade was to hire Hubco, the alleged infringer. Hubco had 
two different techniques. One method was to go to the customer's 
69. That is the theory behind the "exhaustion doctrine" and 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) 
(1982). See also 17 U.S.C. § 906(b) (1984); H. Rep. No. 98-781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 23 
(1984). 
The Hubco court did not indicate, however, that MAl had any contracts with its cus­
tomers requiring them not to modify the governors. The exhaustion doctrine and § 109(a) 
are limited to restrictive agreements limiting customers' use or disposition of products that 
copyright owners have sold to the customers. 
70. There was apparently no contract in the Hubco case, forbidding customers to 
tamper with the governors. See Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 452. 
71. The CONTU Report apparently condoned such contracts. See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
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computer facility to perform the upgrade.72 Such an upgrade was ac­
complished by making a printout of the computer program. 73 From 
the printout, the program was decoded ("unscrambled") and the gov­
ernors were searched out and modified or deleted.74 The second 
method was to supply the customer with software that performed 
these same tasks, allowing the customer to perform the job itself. 75 
The court found that when Hubco went to the customer's facility 
"to conduct on-site upgrades, it made a written printout of the un­
scrambled object code contained in the higher-level operating system 
which the computer owner desire[d]."76 When instead Hubco sup­
plied the customer with a computer program to perform the same 
task, the copying and comparison of the computer code was "done 
completely inside the computer by the software program," but "that 
. . . does not make a difference. "77 Both methods, the court held, 
involved the making of infringing copies of the copyrighted software.78 
As for section 117, the Hubco court stated "Hubco cannot avail 
itself of the owner exemption . . . because Hubco is not the 'owner' 
...."79 It is unclear whether the court found it objectionable merely 
because Hubco made a computer printout of the computer program to 
find the governors that had to be removed or because it found that 
Hubco had made permanent reference copies of the computer pro­
grams for study purposes. The former appears more likely, but if the 
latter is actually the case, there should have been an analysis to deter­
mine whether such a study is a permissible "fair use" of a copyrighted 
work. 80 The main point, however, is that the court would not permit a 
third party to set itself up in the business of facilitating customer adap­
tations, even though section 117 appears to guarantee to the customer 
72. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 452. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 456. It is unclear whether the court means that Hubco made a printout of 
the customer's object code, taken from the customer's computer system, or that Hubco had 
previously unscrambled and made a different copy of the MAl computer program, which 
Hubco brought with it to the customer's site. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. The difference is that between direct infringement and contributory infringement. 
For there to be a contributory infringement, however, someone must first be held a direct 
infringer. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 785 (1984)(copyright 
case); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1961)(pat­
ent case). The reader is left to query whether, given § 117, the customer who used Hubco's 
software is a direct infringer. 
79. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 456. 
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). 
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the right both to make adaptations and to authorize their prepara­
tion.81 The Hubco opinion thus foreshadows the persistent trend of 
subsequent decisions to delete from section 117 the power of computer 
program owners to hire another to adapt programs for them. 
D. The Strohon Case 
In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon,82 the court found that the defend­
ant Slayton's "modification kit" or "enhancement kit" would infringe 
the plaintiffs copyright in a computer program.83 Midway controlled 
copyrights relating to the "PAC-MAN" video game.84 One copyright 
protected the audiovisual aspects of the game.8S A second copyright 
protected the computer program used to operate video game machines 
and cause the display of the audiovisual effects.86 Midway sold the 
machines to "operator" customers.87 Players then paid quarters to use 
the machines to play PAC-MAN. After many plays, enthusiasts be­
came jaded with the game; or they memorized the patterns on the 
screen and continued to play successfully, thus monopolizing the 
machine for several hours on a single quarter. At this point, the oper­
ator ceased to make a profit from the machine.88 In an effort to recoup 
their investments,89 operators sometimes dealt with this problem by 
inserting modification kits into machines.9O The modification kits ena­
81. Hubeo, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 458. 
82. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The following disclaimer is appropriate: The 
author was counsel to one of the parties in this case. 
83. Id. at 753. 
84. Id. at 743. For a discussion of the monetary impact on the public of the PAC­
MAN video game, see Pac-Man Fever, Time, Apr. 5, 1982 at 48. Time observes: 
Pac-Man is bursting out allover. Not only has the 15-month-old arcade 
game swallowed up an estimated $1 billion in quarters to become the hottest item 
in the video-game market, but the little yellow creature is now invading homes 
and spawning nearly 200 offshoots ranging from jeans to a chart-busting pop 
song, Pac-Man Fever. 
Pac-Man is a pie-shaped yellow figure that scores points on a video game by 
gobbling up dots, colorful fruits and four ghosts that inhabit its mazy world. Pac­
Man, however, wilts and vanishes when one of the ghosts eats it. The game was 
originally developed in Japan and is based on a ravenous folk character whose 
appetite could never be appeased. The name comes from paku, the Japanese 
word for "to eat." 
Id. 
85. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 743. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. "Operators" purchase the machines and place them in retail locations acces­
sible to player-customers. 
-88. Id. 
89. From $2,000.00 to $3,000.00 per machine. Id. 
90. Id. at 744. These kits usually cost up to several hundred dollars. Therefore, the 
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bled the operator to complicate and accelerate the action of the game, 
thus rendering the game more challenging to the player and more 
profitable to the owner.91 
Defendant Slayton's enhancement kit contained five computer 
memory chips in which were stored computer programs to operate the 
game.92 These chips were inserted into the machines in place of some 
of the chips that originally came with the machine. The computer 
program modifications stored in the new chips altered the operation of 
PAC-MAN.93 The modified game, CUTE-SEE, was sufficiently dif­
ferent in appearance from PAC-MAN for there to be no copyright 
infringement of the audiovisual aspects of the PAC-MAN game.94 
But the modified computer program was very similar, overall, to the 
computer program that it replaced. The enhancement involved only a 
slight adaptation of the original computer program.9S Defendant Slay­
ton performed the adaptation by "patching" some new lines of code in 
among the old, unaltered parts of the code.96 The entire computer 
program, old and new parts alike, was then encoded into a new set of 
memory chips. Thus, the replacement ROMs contained programs that 
were both adaptations and substantial copies of the original computer 
program. That is what ordinarily happens whenever an adaptation is 
made. CONTU assumed that it would happen when it explained the 
need for section 117.97 
The court in Strohon found, however, that section 117 was "not 
authority for Slayton's sales of reproductions of Midway's program as 
adapted."98 In so ruling, the court emphasized the language at the 
end of section 117 permitting the sale of adaptations only with the 
copyright owner's consent.99 As in Hubco, therefore, the court in 
Stroh on ruled that a third party may not go into the business of pro­
viding adaptations for those apparently entitled to make their own 
cost of an enhancement kit is 10% or less than the value of a new coin-operated video game 
machine. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 748-49 . 
. 95. Id. at 752-53. The court found that 89% of the 16,000 bytes of the computer 
program for PAC-MAN were replicated in the computer program for CUTE-SEE. Id. at 
752. 
96. Id. at 753. A "patch" is a slight modification of a program, done without modi­
fying or recompiling the rest of the program. See KELLy-BooTLE, THE DEVIL'S DP DIC­
TIONARY 99 (1981). 
97. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text. 
98. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 745 n.2. 
99. Id. 
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adaptations. 100 
It is unclear what room, if any, the Strohon court would leave for 
other than direct, personal exercise of the section 117 adaptation right. 
The Strohon case illustrates the usual situation of the owner of a com­
puter program: The operators were not computer programmers; there 
was no way for them to develop their own enhancement kits for their 
machines. They did not own the equipment to program chips with 
computer program adaptations, even if they knew how to write them. 
The only way these operators were going to get enhancement kits for 
their machines was from someone like Slay ton. 101 For the court to 
rule that Slayton could not supply them with enhancement kits was to 
rule that the operators had no right to make or use adaptations. One 
may ask, then, in what circumstances, if any, the court would hold 
that the operators "authorized" someone to make an adaptation for 
them of their PAC-MAN computer programs. 
E. The Micro-Sparc Case 
In Micro-Spare, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 102 the court for all practical 
purposes abolished the provisions in section 117 which permitted own­
ers of copies of computer programs to "authorize" the making of a 
copy for use. Micro-Sparc published Nibble magazine, in which it 
printed copies of computer programs. Nibble subscribers could then 
type (enter by means of the terminal keyboard) the computer pro­
grams into their microcomputers for use.103 Typing the programs was 
a tedious process, however, and one that left much room for error. 
Micro-Sparc, therefore, also offered to its subscribers the opportunity 
to purchase additional copies of the programs that were already typed 
(encoded) onto diskettes, which the computer could read and exe­
100. Id. at 746. The Strohon court went further and interpreted a recent Seventh 
Circuit decision, Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), eert. 
denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1984), as authority for the position that there is no right of an owner 
to modify coin-operated video game machines to enhance the video games. Strohon, 564 F. 
Supp. at 747-48. That decision, however, involved only the audiovisual work copyright. 
Right or wrong as the Artie decision may be concerning audiovisual works, to which § 117 
does not speak, Artie does not address computer programs, to which § 117 specifically 
refers. 
Slayton was an operator of coin-operated video game machines, as well as a would-be 
supplier of enhancement kits. Id. at 743-44. The court's ruling, therefore, apparently pre­
vented Slayton from modifying his own machines. 
101. In point of fact, defendant Slayton was not a computer programmer either. He 
hired a consultant to develop the enhancement kit for him. 
102. 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984). 
103. Id. at 34. 
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cute. 104 Defendant Amtype sought to market to Micro-Sparc's cus­
tomers similar diskettes containing the typed programs. lOS It offered 
the same programs to purchasers of Micro-Sparc's magazine, at a 
much lower price than Micro-Spare charged per program. Amtype 
called this a "typing service," but Micro-Spare called it the piratical 
sale of infringing copies of the computer programs. 106 
It was conceded that subscribers to the magazine were the lawful 
owners of copies of the computer programs purchased from Micro­
Spare, and that Amtype dealt only with such subscribers. 107 The 
question was whether section 117 permitted the subscribers to secure 
additional copies, in diskette form, from anyone other than the origi­
nal seller, Micro-Sparc. lOs The court ruled that the sole purpose of 
section 117(1) was to authorize the owners to input computer pro­
grams into computers. I09 The court then reasoned that section 117 
did not permit subscribers to authorize Amtype to prepare diskette 
copies for them, because Amtype did not itself input the copies into 
the subscribers' computers. IIO Instead, the subscriber used the dis­
kette to input the computer program into the computer. lll 
F. The Formula Case 
The decision in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, 
Inc. 112 illustrates several of the problems in interpreting section 117. 
Apple had successfully obtained a preliminary injunction that enjoined 
Formula from infringing the copyrights in Apple's operating system 
software.ll3 Formula attempted to avoid the impact of the injunction 
by purchasing copies of the operating system, on diskettes, from 
Wong, a licensee of Apple. 1l4 Formula then supplied its customers 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 34 & n.3. 
108. Id. at 35. 
109. Id. at 35. This, of course, flatly contradicts the CONTU Report's explanation 
of the need of computer program owners to make adaptations and enhancements. See 
supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text. But the adaptation issue was not directly 
presented in the Micro-Spare case. 
110. Micro-Spare, 592 F. Supp. at 35. 
111. Id. On this theory, Micro-Sparc's subscribers would not have the right to make 
diskette copies either. Instead, they would be obliged to retype the whole computer pro­
gram each time that they wanted to use it. No appeal was prosecuted in the Micro-Spare 
case. 
112. 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
113. Id. at 618. 
114. ld. at 620, 622. 
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with the Wong diskettes. If it had stopped there, Fonnula probably 
would have prevailed. lls But Fonnula went further, in purported reli­
ance on section 117.ll6 It copied the operating system software from 
the diskette into memory chips, which it supplied to its customers 
along with the diskette, so that the customers could insert the chips 
into their computers. ll7 Doing so greatly increased the convenience of 
using the Fonnula computer and thus presumably made Fonnula's 
product more saleable to customers. llS It also caused the court to 
hold Fonnula in contempt of the injunction. ll9 
Fonnula sought to defend by invoking section 117.120 The court 
found that section 117 was inapplicable on two distinct and independ­
ent grounds. First, Fonnula did not make the chip copies of the pro­
grams for its own use; it made them for its customers, to whom it sold 
the computer, the Wong diskette, and the chips.121 The court ruled 
that section 117 applies only to owner-users of computer programs, 
not to resellers of computer programs. 122 Second, the court found that 
Fonnula's use of the copies in chips was not "essential" within the 
meaning of section 117.123 The court found that customers could use 
the Wong diskettes by loading the software from the diskette into the 
RAM of the computer each time they needed it.124 It may have been 
more "convenient" to have the computer programs in chip fonn,12s 
but "a convenient method of utilizing such a diskette. . . is not 'es­
sential'."126 Rather, the court ruled, " 'Essential' means indispensable 
115. The court implied as much when it observed that "one could employ the Wong 
diskette in a Formula computer by use of a copying method less permanent than the one 
Formula has employed." Ill. at 622. The court indicated that using the diskette to input 
the program into RAM (read/write Random Access Memory) would have been an accept­
able less permanent method. Ill. 
116. Id. at 620. 
117. Id. 
118. It takes much less time and effort to start up a computer with software in chips 
than with software on a diskette. Formula had copied Apple's "Applesoft" and "Autos­
tart" computer programs onto three silicon memory chips which, when inserted into the 
Formula computer, became "permanent and intergral" parts of the machine. Id. 
119. Id. at 623. 
120. Id. at 620. 
121. Id. at 622. Apparently, there was one price for the whole package. 
122. Id. at 621-22. 
123. Id. at 622. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. The software would vanish each time the computer was turned off and 
would have to be reloaded (with some effort) each time it was needed. Making the software 
a part of the machine by putting the computer programs into ROM chips permitted the 
computer to read the programs whenever it was necessary to use them. Ill. 
126. Id. 
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and necessary."127 Accordingly, the court held Formula in contempt 
of the injunction. 128 
IV. 	 THE IMPLICATION OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 
SECTION 117 
The implications of these decisions are disturbing. In Apple Com­
puter, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc. for example, Formula's customers 
became lawful owners of the computer programs in the Wong disket­
tes. Under the court's reasoning, however, the customers would have 
had no right to put the software on the Wong diskette into chips, be­
cause it was no more "essential" for them to do so than it was for 
. Formula. 129 Rather it was a mere "convenience."130 The reference to 
"essential step" in section 117 (1) applies equally to adaptations and 
other copies. If the Apple Computer court's interpretation of "essen­
tial" under section 117(1) as meaning "indispensable" is followed, it 
will largely undermine the principal benefit or privilege that users were 
supposedly to receive from section 117(1) - the right to add enhance­
ments to computer programs. 
CONTU said that section 117(1) was needed to permit users to 
add erihancements to programs that were lacking when the user origi­
nally acquired the program. 131 No such enhancement is ever "indis­
pensable" - for if it were, the user would not have bought the 
program in the first place. A program is usually good for something 
127. Id. 
128. Id. The court viewed the case from the standpoint that Formula was engaging 
in a "mere subterfuge, a clever ploy" and was trying to "hit upon a pretext to avoid the 
impact of the injunction." Id. at 622. It regarded Formula's efforts as unjustifiably based 
on "the fortuitous circumstances of being lawfully [able] to acquire copies of two of Apple's 
most valuable copyrighted programs through purchase of the Wong diskette." Id. 
Yet, that Formula was able to buy the Wong diskette was no mere "fortuitous circum­
stance." Formula was able to do so because Apple chose to license Wong, without restric­
tions as to the use or resale of the diskettes. Apple's choice arguably was based on its desire 
not to so restrict Wong or on its belief that the law did not authorize or permit such 
restrictions. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). But see United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 
U.S. 476, 488 (1926) (a patentee may impose reasonable restrictions on manufacturing 
licensees but must not impose like restrictions on purchasers). 
Once Apple licensed Wong, Apple became legally obligated to accept the conse­
quences of that business decision, and third persons became entitled to whatever rights the 
statute provides in relation to such licenses and goods sold by the licensees - "fortuitous 
circumstance" or otherwise. It would seem that the cause of the problem here is due at 
least as much to the licensor's conduct as the third person's conduct. Perhaps, however, 
the court should have focused on the rights, if any, of customers and owners of Wong 
diskettes rather than on the plaintiff's or defendant's state of mind or expectations. 
129. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l., Inc., 594 F. Supp. at 622. 
130. Id. 
131. CONTU REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
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when it is purchased, but its value can be enhanced by modification. 
Moreover, as time passes, the need for improvements or enhancements 
occurs to users of programs. The need for such improvements is not 
obvious to the customer or the creator when the customer begins to 
use the program. The improvements are not indispensable, but they 
foster progress in the computer software field. That is precisely what 
CONTU promised when it proposed section 117. 
An interpretation of "essential" as meaning necessary to accom­
plish legitimate purposes of the owner of the computer program132 
would be far more in keeping with the CONTU Report's explanation 
of section 117. To be sure, "legitimate" may beg the question, and it 
may be better to particularize the concept of "legitimate" in terms of 
improving the value or utility of the computer program to its lawful 
owner. That the use of the adaptation is more convenient for the 
owner than is the use of the unadapted version of the computer pro­
gram should be deemed to satisfy this test. Given the present state of 
the case law under section 117, however, it is probably desirable to 
amend either section 101 133 (by adding a definition of "essential") or 
section 117 to accomplish this result. 
Another troublesome implication of the Formula decision, under­
scored by the Strohon. Hubeo, and Micro-Spare decisions, is that un­
less third persons are permitted to make adaptations, few will be 
made. Section 117 expressly gives the owners of copies of the com­
puter program the right to "authorize the making" of adaptations. 134 
As a practical matter, the overwhelming majority of computer pro­
gram owners can acquire adaptations only by authorizing someone 
else to make the adaptations. 
The analogous rules of patent law are markedly different from 
those that the lower courts have established under section 117. The 
owner of a patented machine has an adaptation right, like that of sec­
tion 117, although the patent law doctrine is not statutory but judi­
cially decreed. 13s In confirming this adaptation right for purchasers of 
patented machinery, the Supreme Court has analogized the right to 
that of the repair of a worn machine: 
Petitioners in adapting the old machines to a related use were 
doing more than repair in the customary sense; but what they did 
132. Id. 
133. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) defines terms from "anonymous work" to "work made 
for hire." It does not, however, define "essential." 
134. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
135. See Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422 (1964). 
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was kin to repair for it bore on the useful capacity of the old combi­
nation, on which the royalty had been paid. 136 
In repair cases, the owner of a patented machine is not obliged to 
make his own repairs. He is permitted to buy a repair kit from a third 
party, who is in the business of facilitating others' exercise of their 
right to repair. 137 
The patent rule seems to make far more sense than the rule being 
followed under section 117. Rights frequently cannot be exercised 
without the aid of a third party.138 The courts' restriction of section 
117 to "do-it-yourselfers" has turned the adaptation right into an illu­
sory promIse. 
It would appear that there are only two potential legitimate con­
cerns of copyright owners with respect to the adaptation right. First, 
that there is an authorization for the conduct from the owner or legiti­
mate possessor of a copy. Second, that the customer for the new copy 
or adaptation originally acquired a legitimate copy of the computer 
program. What steps are necessary for there to be an "authorization" 
from an owner of a copy under section 1171 To the extent that the 
courts have considered the matter, it would appear that almost noth­
ing will satisfy them. In the Strohon case, would the court have been 
satisfied if the defendant Slayton got a letter of agreement from each 
prospective purchaser of the kit?139 In the Formula case, should the 
defendant Formula have sold its computers together with a Wong dis­
kette and an order blank?l40 
It is unclear what amount of ceremony, if any, would have satis­
136. Id. at 425. 
137. In Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961), the 
accused contributory infringer manufactured and sold replacement parts kits for use in the 
repair of automobile convertible tops. Id. at 337-38. The court held that because the car 
owner did not infringe the patent when it replaced these parts, the supplier was not liable 
either. Id. at 345-36. The supplier in the Aro case made the kits en masse, in advance of 
orders from particular car owners. 
138. See. e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
139. In principle, such a letter of agreement could state: 
This is to advise you that I am the lawful owner of a copy of the computer pro­
gram for the PAC-MAN video game. and I hereby authorize you to make for me 
an adaptation of that computer program. 
140. Perhaps it is unclear whether Formula should have included the following order 
blank: 
I would like you (and I hereby authorize you, within the meaning of 17 
U.S.C. § 117), to prepare for me an adaptation of the Wong diskette that you sold 
me for use in my Formula computer, so that the Autostart and Applesoft com­
puter programs stored in the diskette will be placed into silicon chips that I can 
insert into my Formula computer, thereby saving me the bother of inputting 
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fied either court as to authorization. But the adaptation right of sec­
tion 117 is worthless to most of the supposed beneficiaries if there is 
not some convenient way for them to secure adaptations from third 
persons. Therefore, there should be a reasonable way for owners of 
the adaptation right to vindicate that right. For example, the very act 
of purchase of the adaptation on the part of the customer makes it 
manifest that he wants the adaptation and, therefore, is willing to "au­
thorize" its making and to verbalize the authorization to whatever ex­
tent the law demands. The act of purchase by the owner of a copy of 
the computer program should be deemed an authorization. Moreover, 
it should relate back however far in time is necessary to legitimize the 
transaction, since there is no reason to prohibit advance manufacture 
and stockpiling of the product in anticipation of orders. 
As for the customer being a legitimate customer, it would seem to 
make the most sense to have a rule under which a third person who 
took reasonable steps to insure that he dealt only with lawful owners 
of a computer program could sell adaptations to them, without undue 
documentation or legal formalities. Under this rule, it should have 
been sufficient for the defendant in Strohon to make reasonable efforts 
to be sure that he sold his enhancement kits only to owners of P AC­
MAN coin-operated video game machines. In the Formula case, the 
defendant knew that it was dealing with owners of the Wong diskette, 
because it was engaged in the act of selling Wong diskettes to them at 
the same time that it sold them the chips. 141 In such a case, it should 
not be necessary to complete the diskette sale first, and then separately 
to proceed to sell the chips. Nothing is gained by requiring such sepa­
rate transactions, except to harass the adaptor and customer. 
That is one view of the adaptation right. Another view is that the 
seller of adaptations is a parasite who seeks a free ride on the ingenuity 
and investment of the first comer and, therefore, deserves to encounter 
all possible obstacles in his path. In a case such as Formula, perhaps 
such an argument has some appeal - but only if the court focuses on 
the sale of Apple and Apple-imitator computers. Yet, the computers 
were not the products protected by copyright. The programs in the 
Wong diskette were the only copyrighted products. The court, there­
fore, went too far in considering any equities but those relating to the 
marketing of the programs as such. There was no copyright equity in 
("booting up") those computer programs every time that I want to use them. I 
enclose 25 cents to cover postage and handling. 
Would such a ceremony have changed the situation? 
141. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 620 (C.D. Cal. 
1984). 
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the hardware. Certainly, Apple did not attempt to impose a tie-in be­
tween its hardware and software, and there is no reason for a court to 
impose one indirectly. 142 
As far as the marketing ofthe Wong diskettes was concerned, the 
apparent effect of the unrestricted license to Wong is as if Apple had 
sold the diskettes outright to Formulas's customers - not by mere 
fortuity of circumstance as the court said, but because that is how 
Apple chose (presumably, wisely) to run its business. Despite the pos­
sible "free rider" argument in the Formula case, therefore, the better 
view would be that Apple effectively sold the diskettes to the custom­
ers (or caused the diskettes to be sold to them), and the only question 
left regards their right to secure an adaptation. Whether the cus­
tomer's supplier is a parasite, free rider, or secret disrespecter of intel­
lectual property rights is beside the point. If the customer is lawfully 
entitled to have the adaptation, the supplier commits no wrong by pro­
viding the customer with what the customer may rightfully possess. 
In a case such as Strohon, the parasite/free rider argument has 
even less force. The operators desired to obtain enhancements to 
profit on their investments, or to reduce their losses. An operator 
could perhaps salvage a useless machine and turn it into a money­
producer by making an investment of about ten per cent of the cost of 
the original or a new machine. Rather than calling the act of supply­
ing operators with such kits piracy, parasitism, or free-riding, one 
could equally well call it meeting an expressed public need that section 
117 purports to satisfy. 
The equities of cases such as Micro Sparc and Hubco are less 
clear. The question is whether the courts should lend their support to 
the copyright owner in enforcing his marketing program, or whether 
instead they should leave him to consensual arrangements and 
whatever the market place provides. Whichever way that issue is de­
cided, however, the section 117 analysis used by the courts in those 
cases is inadequate. 
Not many decisions have been rendered so far under section 117. 
But every one of them seems to be faulty, and to presage further inter­
pretations that will belie the promises of the CONTU compromise. 
Perhaps legislative oversight hearings might lead to future interpreta­
tions of section 117 that are more consistent with the CONTU Report . .. 
Perhaps, however, that is too optimistic. Given the development of 
the case law, it seems unrealistic to expect a change in the interpreta­
142. If anything, the court should do the opposite. See Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen­
eral Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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tion of section 117. It is already clear that section 117 needs rewriting. 
It has not proved to be the charter of the software user's rights that it 
was designed to be. Its promises have been illusory. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSALS 
Whether amendment of the present copyright law to correct the 
shortcomings of section 117 is appropriate raises broader questions. 
The entire treatment of computer programs in the present copyright 
law is unsatisfactory. In some ways, copyright law gives too little to 
software creators (or to proprietors who invest in causing software cre­
ation or distribution) and in some ways it gives too much. Large ar­
eas, such as expert systems, languages, and algorithms, are left 
unattended as supposed "mere ideas." The incentives to creation and 
investment that copyright law should give in those areas are withheld. 
The treatment of enhancements ~nd compatibility under the present 
Copyright Act is questionable. The test for determining whether there 
is copyright infringement when there is not a case of slavish copying is 
probably useless. Generally, the balance struck among the rights of 
users, creators, investors, competitors, and the public is borrowed 
from a distant field of activity (in the main, creation of belles lettres 
and the printing and sale of books) and is inappropriate in the software 
context. These problems are beyond the scope of this article. Their 
existence, however, raises the question of whether it is worthwhile to 
make incremental improvements in the existing copyright law. 
The social and political implications of that question are too com­
plex to discuss here. The question should not be ignored, but it cannot 
be answered in the present context. Suffice it to say, therefore, that 
something is always better than nothing. If the transaction cost is not 
greater than the value of the change and if there are not more pressing 
concerns, it is better to improve the present unsatisfactory copyright 
law in small ways rather than not at all. On the basis of that logic, or 
perhaps that assumption, this author proposes the following group of 
changes to implement the proposals discussed above. 
1. Add a new section 106(6) to make execution (use) of a com­
puter program a violation of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner, regardless of whether inputting the computer program involves 
the reproduction of the work in a fixed copy. As amended, section 
106143 would read: 
143. Compare supra note 16. 
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§ 106 EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHTED WORKS 
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to do and authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ...; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work; 
(3) to distribute copies ...; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic ... works, to 
perform the work publicly; 

[and] 

(5) in the case of literary, musical . . . or sculptural works 
. to display the copyrighted work publicly[.]; and 
(6) in the case ofcomputer programs, to cause the execution of 
the program in a machine by means ofa copy that the actor knows or 
should know was reproduced or distributed without the authorization 
of the owner of copyright. 
2. Amend section 117 to pennit adaptations and copies that are 
beneficial to the customer, regardless of whether they are indispensa­
ble and even though a third party prepares them. Moreover, third 
parties should be pennitted to distribute adaptations irrespective of 
whether they are encoded in or along with the original media and orig­
inal encoding, if the copyright oW!1er has received one royalty (or the 
royalty, when a lump-sum or paid-Up license is involved) for each copy 
of the program so distributed. One possible version of such an 
amended section 117144 would read as follows: 
§ 117. LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS: COMPUTER 
PROGRAMS 
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, but subject 
to subsection (b), the owner of a copy of a computer program or 
other person to whom the copyright owner has passed or caused to 
be passed possession and control of a copy of the computer pro­
gram, or any person in lawful custody of a copy who has a right to 
use it, collectively referred to hereinafter in this section as "custom­
ers," is permitted: 
(1) to reproduce or authorize the reproduction of another 
copy; 
(2) to prepare or authorize the preparation of a derivative 
work based on the computer program; and 
(3) to execute or cause the execution of the computer pro­
gram by means of the original copy or a copy authorized by 
this section. 
(b) Any further copy or derivative work authorized by this 
144. Compare supra text accompanying note 10. 
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section must be for archival purposes only or for the purpose of 
effectuating legitimate purposes of the customer. Legitimate pur­
poses include convenient execution of the computer program and 
improving the value or utility of the computer program to 
customers. 
(c) A third party may reproduce a copy or prepare a derivative 
work authorized by this section, or distribute the copy or derivative 
work, without liability to the copyright owner, if the third party: 
(1) takes reasonable steps to insure that it distributes cop­
ies only to customers; and 
(2) does not otherwise use or dispose of copies. 
(d) A customer may distribute or redistribute a copy or deriva­
tive work authorized by this section only in combination with the 
original copy, unless the original copy has been destroyed. In no 
case may the customer distribute copies or derivative works to a 
number of different persons greater than the number of legitimate 
original copies that the customer acquired. 
In conclusion, the current copyright laws must be amended in 
order to fulfill the stated intentions of CONTU and, by incorporation, 
those of the Congress. Judicial interpretation of section 117 has de­
prived the software user of the right of adaptation, and rendered Con­
gressional intent a mere illusory promise. 
